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Abstract
The proposed experiment will examine the effect of deceptive behavior on memory.
Participants will be assigned to a “strong-incentive to cheat” or “weak-incentive to
cheat” condition and play the adapted Sequential Dyadic Die-Rolling paradigm. Spe-
cifically, Player A (computer; participants think it is another participant) throws a die
and reports it to Player B (participant). Then Player B throws his/her die, remembers
the outcome, and reports it to Player A. Participants in the “strong-incentive to
cheat” condition are monetarily punished if their die roll outcome differs from Player
A's die roll outcome. Participants in the “weak-incentive to cheat” condition are not
punished if the die roll outcomes differ. Two-days later, memory for the die-rolling
event will be assessed. We predict that participants in the “strong-incentive to cheat”
condition will have lower belief and recollection for the die-rolling event and will
report more errors than participants in the “weak-incentive to cheat” condition.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Avoiding punishment is one of the reasons why people lie in investi-
gations and, ultimately, in the courtroom. But what happens to mem-
ory for events that have been lied about when the purpose of the lie
is to avoid punishment? Take for instance the case of Alfred Dewayne
Brown (Innocent Project, 2020). Brown was arrested for a store rob-
bery during which a cashier and police officer were killed. Two accom-
plices, named Dashan Glaspie and Elijah Joubert, claimed that Brown
was the shooter (Possley, 2015). In exchange for his testimony,
Glaspie avoided the death penalty and received a 30-year prison sen-
tence. Additionally, Alfred's girlfriend, Ericka Dockery, testified that
Brown confessed to the crime while under the threat of losing cus-
tody of her children. Even though shortly after the conviction Joubert
and Dockery recanted their statements and admitted that these were
false testimonies, new evidence was necessary to exonerate Brown.
The recanted statements were deemed unreliable (Possley, 2015;
Innocence project, 2020). A crucial question underpinning cases such
as the one described here is whether memories about an experienced
event become adversely affected after having lied about the event?
More specifically, does engaging in deceptive behaviors to avoid pun-
ishment lead to memory impairing effects? This is the focus of the
current experiment.
1.1 | Forced confabulation and memory
Empirical research in the memory and deception domain suggest that
lying can have adverse effects on memory (Otgaar & Baker, 2018). In
this experiment, we will specifically examine the effects of confabula-
tions on memory. One method to study the effects of confabulations
on memory was developed by Ackil and Zaragoza (1998) and is known
as the forced confabulation paradigm. In this paradigm participants
watch a short video about a boy's experience in a summer camp and
are later interviewed about details in the video. A crucial element of
this interview is that participants are additionally questioned about
details that never occurred in the video. Before the interview, partici-
pants are divided into two groups: the forced confabulation and
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control group. The forced confabulation group has to answer all ques-
tions and guess when uncertain, while the control group has to answer
only when they are certain and avoid guessing. After a one-week delay,
participants' memory is examined using a source-monitoring test. Previ-
ous research using the forced confabulation paradigm has consistently
shown that participants formed false memories for their confabulations
(Ackil & Zaragoza, 1998, 2011; Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2008, 2013;
Drivdahl & Zaragoza, 2001; Hanba & Zaragoza, 2007; Otgaar
et al., 2014; Pezdek et al., 2007, 2009; Zaragoza et al., 2001).
Numerous studies have examined variables that can inflate the
forced confabulation effect (Hanba & Zaragoza, 2007; Pezdek
et al., 2007, 2009; Zaragoza et al., 2001). One variable that has been
examined is confirmatory interviewer feedback. In studies using this
type of feedback (Hanba & Zaragoza, 2007; Zaragoza et al., 2001),
participants followed similar steps as in the forced confabulation para-
digm. However, the forced confabulation group additionally received
confirmatory interviewer feedback (e.g., “That's right, _____ is the cor-
rect answer”) or neutral interviewer feedback (e.g., “____, O.K.”)
expressed in a monotone voice for the details that did not occur in
the video. The findings showed that confirmatory interviewer feed-
back not only led to false memories for confabulated items after a
one-week delay, but also increased the participants' persistence and
confidence in their false memories (Hanba & Zaragoza, 2007; Zara-
goza et al., 2001). This suggests that there is a specific social-
motivational factor that can enhance the forced confabulation effect.
Another variable that impacts the forced confabulation effect is
whether the confabulation is forced or voluntary (Pezdek et al., 2007,
2009). To examine this issue, Pezdek and colleagues had participants
watch a video of a car-jacking and then gave them 16 answerable and
six unanswerable questions about the video. All participants received
instructions to answer all questions. However, half of the participants
had the option to indicate “I do not know”. A week later, the memory
for the video was assessed through the same 22 questions but now all
participants received the “I do not know” option. The forced confabu-
lation effect was detected for participants who did not have the “I do
not know” option available in the initial test. Interestingly, participants
who confabulated a response for unanswerable questions when the “I
do not know” option was available were more likely to repeat that
answer at the second memory test relative to participants who were
forced to confabulate during the first memory test. This effect
increased when participants were questioned and forced to fabricate
multiple times about details in the video (Pezdek et al., 2007). These
findings suggest that when participants voluntarily self-generate an
answer to unanswerable questions, they are more likely to produce
persisting false memories than when the responses are forced
(Pezdek et al., 2007, 2009). That is, if people voluntarily self-generate
misinformation, it is more likely that this misinformation will be incor-
porated into memory in comparison to people who are forced to self-
generate misinformation. Taken together, the social-motivational role
of confirmatory interviewer feedback and whether misinformation
was voluntarily self-generated seem to increase the forced confabula-
tion effect (Hanba & Zaragoza, 2007; Pezdek et al., 2007, 2009;
Zaragoza et al., 2001).
1.2 | Self-generated deceptive behavior and
memory
In a recent study, a different approach was used to examine the
effects of confabulations on memory (Kouchaki & Gino, 2016). Specif-
ically, in this study, the authors examined the memory impairing
effects caused by self-generated deceptive behavior for monetary
rewards. In their experiment, participants played a die-rolling game
wherein they threw a die 20 times. Each die roll counted for points
which later was converted into money. Higher die rolls led to
increased earnings for the participant. Before each die roll, partici-
pants had to indicate whether they wanted the top side (visible) or
down side (invisible) to count. That is, if a participant chose the down
side of the die roll to count and then threw the number “3,” he/she
received 4 points because the number “4” was on the down side of
the die. If the participant chose the top side of the die roll to count
and then threw the number “3,” he/she received 3 points. Critically,
half of the participants had to explicitly report which side they wanted
to count before throwing the die (no-cheating condition), while the
other half of participants could decide it mentally (likely-cheat condi-
tion) and were permitted to keep this decision to themselves. After a
two-day delay, participants were asked to think back to the die-rolling
task and completed the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire via a
7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree) (AMQ;
Rubin et al., 2003). The AMQ measures recollection and belief for
autobiographical memories via questions assessing visual imagery,
auditory imagery, emotions, and exact knowledge regarding the mem-
ory (e.g., “as I think about the task, I can actually remember it”).
Kouchaki and Gino (2016) found that participants in the likely-
cheating condition scored lower on the AMQ for the die-rolling task
compared with participants in the no-cheating condition. This effect
has been termed unethical amnesia. Unethical amnesia specifically
refers to situations in which engaging in deceptive behavior leads to
lower recollection and belief of an experienced event (Kouchaki &
Gino, 2016; but see also Stanley et al., 2018). However, memory accu-
racy for the die rolling game itself was not examined. In the current
experiment, we will examine the effects of unethical amnesia in an
adapted paradigm. Additionally, we will assess whether engaging in
deceptive behaviors affects the memory for the event itself.
One possible underlying mechanism of unethical amnesia is moti-
vated forgetting (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). Motivated forgetting
essentially refers to an active attempt to forget unwanted experi-
ences, such as behaving inappropriately (e.g., cheating on an exam).
Research demonstrated that instructing participants during encoding
to forget items, compared to instructions to remember, can lead to
forgetting of the to-be-forgotten items (MacLeod, 1998). This type of
forgetting is termed directed forgetting. Similar forgetting effects have
also been reported when participants are instructed to forget items at
retrieval (Anderson & Green, 2001). Taken together, these findings
suggest that consciously forgetting specific experiences can lead to
memory impairing effects.
With respect to motivated forgetting, when a person's behavior
does not align with their perceived self-image (e.g., as an honest
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person), it can lead to an individual actively forgetting their past
behavior, resulting in similar memory undermining effects as directed
forgetting (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Kouchaki & Gino, 2016).
Take for instance the hypothetical case of Elsa. Elsa is an honest student
who, however, has now cheated on an exam to get a higher grade. This
dishonest behavior threatens her moral self-image which motivates her
to actively forget the dishonest behavior. When Elsa actively tries to for-
get her dishonest behavior, the memory for it fades, although the mem-
ory for unrelated ethical details such as the content of the exam will not.
Hence, the idea of motivated forgetting is that actively trying to forget
past dishonest behavior leads to memory undermining effects for the
dishonest act. However, the memory for details unrelated to their ethical
behavior might remain intact (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014; Kouchaki &
Gino, 2016; Shu et al., 2011).
1.3 | The current experiment
The primary goal of our experiment is to examine whether voluntary
self-generated deceptive behavior, motivated by punishment avoid-
ance, has contaminating effects on memory. Hence, we aim to repli-
cate the results of Kouchaki and Gino (2016) where recollection and
belief for the die rolling event was lower for the participants who
engaged in deceptive behaviors compared to participants who did
not. To study the adverse effects of deceptive behavior on memory,
participants will play an adapted version of the Sequential Dyadic
Die-Rolling paradigm (Weisel & Shalvi, 2015). Usually, in this para-
digm, participant A (computer in our experiment although participants
think it is another participant) anonymously rolls a die and then
reports the corresponding number to participant B (participant). After
participant B receives the reported die roll, participant B anonymously
rolls a die and then reports the outcome to participant A. A standard
finding is the disproportional high numbers of identical reports when
rewarding outcomes that were aligned (e.g., if both reported number
5, both received 5 euros) (Weisel & Shalvi, 2015; Wouda et al., 2017).
This result is in line with other literature showing that a negative
aspect of collaboration is an increased tendency towards dishonest
behavior (Conrads et al., 2013; Kocher et al., 2018; Wouda
et al., 2017). In the present experiment, we will adapt the Sequential
Dyadic Die-Rolling paradigm for two reasons. First, in the adapted
version, participants will not be able to earn monetary rewards but
can avoid monetary deductions when engaging in collaborative decep-
tive behavior. This modification of the Sequential Dyadic Die-Rolling
paradigm reflects more accurately the incentives suspects or eyewit-
nesses have in the courtroom to lie, which is to avoid punishment.
Additionally, it has been demonstrated that avoiding a loss is a stron-
ger incentive to behave dishonestly than gaining rewards (Schindler &
Pfattheicher, 2017). Second, the adapted version allows us to observe
what the participants actually threw and reported at an individual
level. Having this behavioral ground truth enables us to examine the
effects of lying on the memory accuracy for the event instead of
solely the memory experience, as was the case in the studies on
unethical amnesia (Kouchaki & Gino, 2016).
Specifically, to examine the effects of self-generated deceptive
behavior, driven by punishment avoidance, on memory, we will ran-
domly assign participants to either a “strong-incentive to cheat” con-
dition or the “weak-incentive to cheat” condition. Participants in both
conditions will receive five euros in their “bank” at the start of the
experiment. In the “strong-incentive to cheat” condition, participants
will be punished through monetary deductions if the reported num-
bers are not equivalent (i.e., aligned outcomes). In the “weak-incentive
to cheat” condition participants are instructed to throw, remember,
and report the die roll outcome and are told that only the other partic-
ipant will receive 1 point if their reported numbers are equivalent.
After a two-day delay, we will examine all participants' memory expe-
rience for the die rolling event via the AMQ (Rubin et al., 2003). Addi-
tionally, we will assess a specific die roll memory questionnaire
regarding the thrown and reported die rolls (i.e., “how many times did
you throw/report each number?”; “what was the color of the thrown/
reported die?”) (see Appendix B). According to the notion of moti-
vated forgetting, behaving dishonestly can cause people to actively
try to forget that behavior, leading to impoverished memory for such
act (Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014). Hence, we predict that partici-
pants in the “strong-incentive to cheat” condition will have lower rec-
ollection and belief for the die rolling event and perform worse on the
specific die roll memory accuracy questions. That is, we expect to rep-
licate the unethical amnesia effect and predict to observe higher
incorrect recall of thrown and reported die rolls.
1.4 | Hypotheses
1. We predict that participants in the “strong-incentive to cheat” condi-
tion will have lower recollection and belief scores for the die-rolling task
on the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (Rubin et al., 2003)
compared with participants in the “weak-incentive to cheat” condition.
2. Additionally, we predict that the magnitude of the errors on the
specific die roll memory accuracy questions will be greater for the
“strong-incentive to cheat” condition compared with the “weak-
incentive to cheat” condition. The magnitude of errors is defined
by the difference between the amount of times a participant actu-
ally threw/reported a number and the amount they remembered
having thrown/reported a number.
1.5 | Pilot study
In a pilot study, we examined whether our manipulation
(i.e., punishment avoidance) led to more cheating for participants in
the “strong-incentive to cheat” condition than participants in the
“weak-incentive to cheat” condition in the adapted Sequential Dyadic
Die-Rolling paradigm. We also examined the effectiveness of our pro-
cedure through participants' self-reported experiences. We expected
that more participants in the “strong-incentive to cheat” condition
would lie and would do so more frequently than participants in the
“weak-incentive to cheat” condition.
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2 | METHOD
2.1 | Participants, materials, design, and procedure
For the pilot study, we recruited 50 participants (Mage = 41.1,
SD = 12.9, range: 23–70; 26 males) via Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). The pilot study was a one-session study and took on average
16.3 minutes (SD = 6.2 min). All participants were rewarded with five
dollars for their participation, regardless of their performance on the
adapted Sequential Dyadic Die-Rolling paradigm. None of the partici-
pants failed the attention checks (i.e., “What did Jamie_1789 throw”).
The experiment was conducted online via Qualtrics. Data are available
on the Open Science Framework (OSF; https://osf.io/u2nhv/?view_
only=93e980bcc68449ada41b411d0ed9751b).
Participants took part in the adapted Sequential Dyadic Die-
Rolling paradigm (see Materials for Current Experiment) and com-
pleted Part 1 (see Procedure for Current Experiment). Qualtrics ran-
domly assigned participants to either the “strong-incentive to cheat”
condition (n = 24) or the “weak-incentive to cheat” condition
(n = 26). After completing the adapted Sequential Dyadic Die-Roll
paradigm, participants were asked to rate their agreement/disagree-
ment on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly dis-
agree) for the following five statements: (i) whether participants
agreed that their die roll was completely anonymous – only they could
know what they rolled, (ii) whether they agreed that they played with
another participant, (iii) whether they thought the die roll was fair
(completely random, like a real die), (iv) whether they suspected that
the researchers would check whether they cheated during the die roll
game, and lastly (v) whether they cheated in the die rolling game.
The number of lies told was calculated by examining the number
of times participants' die roll reports were different from what they
actually threw and whether their report was the required number to
avoid monetary deduction (i.e., “strong-incentive to cheat” condition)
or to give the other participant (i.e., Jamie_1789) 1 point (i.e., “weak-
incentive to cheat” condition). A participant was classified as a liar
when they lied at least once.
3 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The aim of the pilot study was to examine whether participants would
engage in deceptive behavior to avoid punishment. Our findings showed
that, overall, 41.6% (10/24) of participants in the “strong-incentive to
cheat” condition lied to avoid punishment. In total, participants in the
“strong-incentive to cheat” condition lied 120 times. In contrast, 23%
(6/26) of participants in the “weak-incentive to cheat” condition lied to
give the other participant (i.e., computer) a point. In the “weak-incentive
to cheat” condition participants lied 68 times in total.
We also examined the effectiveness of our manipulation through
participants' self-reports. We found that overall participants agreed
that their die roll was completely anonymous – only they knew what
they rolled (62%; 31/50) (M = 3.10, SD = 1.98). Also, 88% (44/50) of
participants agreed that the die was fair (completely random, like a
real die) (M = 2.18, SD = 1.21). Ninety percent (45/50) of participants
agreed that they played with another participant (M = 1.86,
SD = 1.29). Participants were divided as to whether researchers were
going to check if they cheated in the die roll game: 44% (22/50)
agreed, 24% (12/50) neither agreed nor disagreed, and 32% disagreed
(M = 3.92, SD = 1.95). Finally, we found that 56.3% (9/16) of partici-
pants admitted that they engaged in deceptive behavior when they
cheated (M = 5.68, SD = 2.08).
Taken together these results suggest that avoiding punishment
can lead to higher rates of deceptive behavior and that our manipula-
tion thus was successful. However, there were participants in the
“strong-incentive to cheat” condition who remained honest even if
they were punished. A possible explanation for participants remaining
honest is that a considerable number of participants were aware that
their die rolls were going to be checked. Hence, it is possible that this
awareness made participants behave in a more socially desirable man-
ner, reducing the amount of cheating observed in the “strong-
incentive to cheat” condition. As an exploratory aim of the current
experiment, we will examine whether in the main experiment, such
honest participants will be present as well in the “strong-incentive to
cheat” condition. If so, we will use the honest participants of the
“strong-incentive to cheat” condition as an additional control condi-
tion. Specifically, we will examine the adverse memory effects
between participants in the “strong-incentive to cheat” condition that
engaged in deceptive behavior and those who did not. Finally, we will
conduct exploratory analyses to examine whether cheating for selfish
reasons (e.g., avoiding punishment) impacts memory differently as
compared with cheating for prosocial reasons (e.g., giving the other
participant 1 point without any personal benefit).
4 | CURRENT EXPERIMENT
4.1 | Method
4.1.1 | Participants
A Bayes Factor Design Analysis (BFDA; Schönbrodt &
Wagenmakers, 2018; Schönbrodt & Stefan, 2018) for a directional
Bayesian t-test was performed to determine the sample size. We
aimed for compelling strength of evidence of six. That is, our BFDA
fixed-N design was based on a BF10 = 6 meaning that we based our
sample size calculation on whether we can obtain substantial evidence
that the alternative hypothesis is six times more in favor than the null
hypothesis, if there is indeed an effect. We decided to use a BF10 = 6
to detect, at the least, solid moderate evidence in favor of the alterna-
tive hypothesis (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014; Schönbrodt &
Wagenmakers, 2018). We used a cautionary expected effect size
(d = 0.5) based on the study by Kouchaki and Gino (2016) where they
found an effect size d = 0.57. With a probability of 0.90 and a default
Cauchy √2/2 prior distribution for the alternative hypothesis, the
BFDA indicated that we require a total sample size of 238 partici-
pants.1 Participants will receive a monetary reward in the form of a
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voucher. Amount of the monetary reward depends on their perfor-
mance in the Sequential Dyadic Die-Rolling paradigm (max = 7 euro).
Participants will be recruited from KU Leuven via flyers, advertise-
ments, and the SONA System.
The experiment was approved by the Social and Societal Ethics
Committee from the KU Leuven (G-2020-2151-R2[MAR]). Also, the
experiment will be preregistered on the Open Science Framework
(OSF) and the materials and raw data will be made available at the
OSF (TBD).
4.1.2 | Materials
Sequential Dyadic Die-Rolling Paradigm (adapted). The Sequential
Dyadic Die-Rolling paradigm (Weisel & Shalvi, 2015) will be adapted
for the current experiment and is focused on the aligned outcomes
condition. The adapted paradigm for the “strong-incentive to cheat”
condition goes as follows: Player A (i.e., computer) throws a die and
reports it to Player B (actual participant). However, participants are
told that they are playing the die rolling game with another partici-
pant. To ascertain that participants in both conditions are attentive to
the task, hence remembering the reported die roll, they will receive a
follow-up question about the reported number of Player A. Then
Player B throws the die anonymously, remembers the outcome, and
reports it back to Player A. This procedure is repeated 20 times. At
the start of the experiment, participants will start with five euros each
in their “bank.” If participants report the same number as Player A,
there will be no deductions from the five euros in the “bank.” If
they do not report the same number as Player A, 25 cents will be
deducted (20  0.25 = 5 euro) (see Figure 1). Participants in the
“weak-incentive to cheat” condition are informed that they have
to throw the die, remember the outcome, and report it to Player
A. If they report the same number as Player A, then only Player A
will receive 1 point. If they do not report the same number as
Player A, then Player A receives 0 points. This experiment will be
conducted online via Qualtrics permitting us to establish the gro-
und truth of the actually thrown and reported die rolls by the par-
ticipants. Using JavaScript, we created a die roll game in Qualtrics
through which we can track what the participants actually threw
and reported.
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire. After a two-day delay,
participants receive six questions of the autobiographical memory
questionnaire (AMQ; Rubin et al., 2003; Kouchaki & Gino, 2016) (see
Appendix A). The AMQ measures recollection and belief in autobio-
graphical memories via questions assessing visual imagery, auditory
imagery, emotions, and exact knowledge regarding the memory. The
questions will be rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly agree,
7 = strongly disagree).
Specific Die Roll Memory Questionnaire. Along with the AMQ,
the participants have to answer two estimation questions assessing
the participants' memory for the die rolls (i.e., “how many times did
you throw each number?”). Additionally, participants' memory for the
color of the die when throwing and reporting the die rolls is tested
(i.e., “what was the color of the thrown die?”) (see Appendix B).
4.2 | Design and procedure
This experiment will use a between subject design (Condition: strong-
incentive to cheat vs weak-incentive to cheat). The dependent vari-
ables are the 7-point Likert scale scores on the six questions of the
AMQ and the amount of errors on the specific die roll memory accu-
racy questions. Participants will be randomly assigned to either one or
the other condition. The experiment will be designed via Qualtrics and
will be performed online. The experiment will consist of two parts.
Part 1 will be the adapted Sequential Dyadic Die-Rolling Paradigm.
Part 2 will take place after a two-day delay and will consist of two
memory tests.
Before the experiment starts, participants will be requested to
give their informed consent to participate in the study. All participants
will first answer some demographical questions and then check
whether the throwing die was fair (completely random, like a real die).
To increase the feeling for participants that they are playing with
another human being we will ask them to enter a username. More-
over, they will be told to wait until we connect them with another par-
ticipant and after 15–30 sec, participants are informed that they are
going the play the die roll game with Jamie_1789 (i.e., computer).
Then, Qualtrics will randomly assign them to either the “strong-
incentive to cheat” or “weak-incentive to cheat” condition. Partici-
pants in the “strong-incentive to cheat” condition will receive the fol-
lowing instructions: “. You will play a die rolling game with Jamie_1789.
Both you and Jamie_1789 have already received five euros to play the
game – this money is in your “bank”. The game is played as follows:
Jamie_1789 will first anonymously roll a die and remember the number
he/she threw. Jamie_1789 will report this number to you. Then you will
be shown what Jamie_1789 reported. Subsequently, you will anony-
mously throw a die. You will have to remember what you threw. You will
have to report this number. Jamie_1789 will be informed of your reportedF IGURE 1 Procedure of the experiment
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number. Performance on the die rolling task can lower the amount of
money in your “bank” (see table below). If you report identical numbers,
there will be no deductions of your five euros in the “bank”(for example,
both Jamie_1789 and you reported the number 4). If you report a differ-
ent number than Jamie_1789, then both of you will be deducted 25 cents
of your already earned 5 euros. In total you will throw the die and report
the number 20 times. We will start with 5 practice trials for you to under-
stand the game. These practice trials have no consequences for your
already earned 5 euros. After the practice trials the experiment will start.
The die rolls are completely anonymous”.
Participants in the “weak-incentive to cheat” condition will be
given the following instructions: “You will play a die rolling game
with Jamie_1789. Both you and Jamie_1789 have already received
five euros for participating in Part 1 of the experiment – this money is
in your “bank”. The game is played as follows: Jamie_1789 will first
anonymously roll a die and remember the number he/she threw.
Jamie_1789 will report this number to you. Then you will be shown
what Jamie_1789 reported. Subsequently, you will throw anony-
mously a die. You will have to remember what you threw. You will have
to report this number. Jamie_1789 will be informed of your reported
number. Performance on the die rolling task can give Jamie_1789 points
(see table below). If you report identical numbers, Jamie_1789 gets
1 point (for example, both you and Jamie_1789 reported the number 4).
If you report a different number than Jamie_1789, then Jamie_1789
will receive 0 points. In total, you will throw the die and report the num-
ber 20 times. We will start with 5 practice trials for you to understand
the game. These practice trials do not count yet for points. After the
practice trials the experiment will start. The die rolls are completely
anonymous”. Afterwards, participants will be informed that they will
receive a link after 48 hours wherein they will have to complete Part
2 of the experiment. Qualtrics will automatically send out the links
after 48 h. Participants will be informed that if they do not respond
within 24 h of receiving the link, they will be unable to partake in
Part 2 of the study. To ensure that participants complete both parts
of the study, participants will be told that they will receive payment
on completion of Part 2.
Part 2 takes place 48 h after completion of Part 1. The second
part of the experiment will also be conducted online. Part 2 consists
of the six questions from the AMQ and four specific die roll memory
questions. Participants will be informed that for each specific die
rolling memory question, they will earn 50 cents for each correct
answer. For the estimation questions, participants are told that they
threw the die in total 20 times and their accuracy is based on how
well they remember the distribution of these 20 die rolls and that
there is an accepted margin of error of 20%. The accuracy rewards
were included to stimulate participants' accuracy and to encourage
the reporting of truthful responses from memory.2 Hence, in total par-
ticipants will be able to earn seven euros for completion of the experi-
ment. Participants will have to answer 10 questions about their
memory for die rolls during the game in Part 1. Lastly, we will ask the
participants a question regarding the intent of the study (i.e., “In your
opinion, what was the aim of the study?”). Afterwards participants will
be thanked and debriefed.
5 | DATA ANALYSIS PLAN
5.1 | Manipulation check
Before conducting the main statistical analyses, we will first examine
how many participants cheated in each condition (“strong-incentive
to cheat” vs. “weak-incentive to cheat”) and how many times they did
so. This step will shed light on the strength of our manipulation, and
may be an explanatory factor in case we fail to find evidence for an
effect of self-generated lies on memory. Additionally, these analyses
will determine the number of participants cheating for selfish reasons
(e.g., punishment avoidance), for pro-social reasons (e.g., giving a point
to the other participant without any personal benefit), and the number
of participants that remained honest despite such incentives to cheat.
5.2 | Hypothesis 1
Statistical analyses will be performed between the “strong-incentive
to cheat” condition and the “weak-incentive to cheat” condition on
the following two dependent variables: mean AMQ scores and
amount of specific die roll errors. The AMQ scores are based on six
questions wherein participants indicate on a 7-point Likert scale their
recollection of the event. To assess the internal consistency of the
AMQ scores, Cronbach's alpha and Omega coefficient will be calcu-
lated. Scores will be averaged across all six questions if coefficient
Omega >.65. Then we will perform a Bayesian t-tests with a default
Cauchy √2/2 prior distribution in the direction that the “strong-
incentive to cheat” condition will score lower on the AMQ than the
“weak-incentive to cheat” condition, as seen in the study by Kouchaki
and Gino (2016). Along with the directional Bayesian t-test with we
will perform an analogous frequentist analysis, namely the Welch's
independent sample t-test. For the Welch's independent sample t-test
the following values will be reported: t, degrees of freedom, p,
Hedges' g and its 95% confidence interval. g Our Bayes Factor Design
Analysis is based on finding compelling strength of a BF10 > 6 in favor
of the alternative hypothesis. Hence, we will consider our hypotheses
supported when the BF10 > 6. However, if BF10 is between 3 and
6 we will consider the hypotheses supported with weak evidence.
Additionally, we will consider that our hypotheses are supported from
a frequentist viewpoint when p < .05.
5.3 | Hypothesis 2
We will conduct a statistical analysis to examine the magnitude of the
specific die roll errors. For this analysis, the two estimation questions
of the specific die rolling questions are used (i.e., how many times did
you report/throw each number?). The answers to the estimation
questions are compared to the ground truth of how many times they
actually threw and reported each number. As for before, the ground
truth can be tracked for each participant individually via Qualtrics. To
examine the magnitude of the specific die rolls errors, we will measure
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how far off the memory of the thrown or reported die roll was compared
to what they actually threw or reported. For instance, when a participant
threw the number “6” six times but indicated on the memory test that
he/she remembers throwing the number “6” only one time. This would
be an error of greater magnitude compared to when a participant
remembered throwing the number “6” five times. Hence, the difference
between what was actually reported or thrown and what was indicated
on the memory task is used as the indicator for the magnitude of an
error. For instance, if a participant threw number “6” four times, but indi-
cates on the memory task that he/she threw the number “6” only two
times, then it is scored as two errors. Participants can have a maximum
of 80 errors on the two estimation questions.
Based on these two different scores we will run a directional Bayes-
ian t-test with a default Cauchy √2/2 prior distribution wherein we
expect the “strong-incentive to cheat” condition to have errors of
greater magnitude on the specific die roll questions compared to the
“weak-incentive to cheat” condition. This is, we expect deceptive behav-
ior motivated by punishment avoidance to impair memory accuracy.
Along with the directional Bayesian t-test we will perform an analogous
frequentist analysis, namely the Welch's independent sample t-test. For
the Welch's independent sample t-test the following values will be
reported: t, degrees of freedom, p, Hedges' g and its 95% confidence
interval. Our Bayes Factor Design Analysis is based on finding compelling
strength of a BF10 > 6 in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Hence, we
will consider our hypotheses supported when the BF10 > 6. However, if
BF10 is between 3 and 6 we will consider the hypotheses supported with
weak evidence. Additionally, we will consider that our hypotheses are
supported from a frequentist viewpoint when p < .05.
5.4 | Exclusion criteria
The exclusion criteria are as follows: (i) if participants do not respond to
the memory task within 24 h of sending the link, (ii) if they make more
4 or more errors on the practice trials (before experiment starts), (iii) if
participants fail to correctly answer 4 out of the 20 attention checks
correctly throughout the experiment (i.e., “What did Jamie_1789
throw?”), and (iv) if participants identified the true aim of the study.
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1 From a frequentist perspective, a sensitivity analysis concluded that
based on the planned sample size with 90% power, we are able detect
an effect size as small as d > .38. However, it is beyond our resources to
collect the sample size for our Bayesian data analysis for an effect size
d = .38 (N = 386). However, we believe that our planned sample size
(N = 238) allows us to find convincing evidence when the effect is
indeed d = .5 or larger through the Bayesian and frequentist data ana-
lyses, while also able to detect smaller effects (d = .38) with high power
(90%) using the frequentist approach.
2 All participants received the accuracy reward, regardless of their scores.
REFERENCES
Ackil, J. K., & Zaragoza, M. S. (1998). Memorial consequences of forced
confabulation: Age differences in susceptibility to false memories.
Developmental Psychology, 34, 1358–1372. https://doi.org/10.1037/
0012-1649.34.6.1358
Ackil, J. K., & Zaragoza, M. S. (2011). Forced fabrication versus interviewer
suggestions: Differences in false memory depend on how memory is
assessed. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25, 933–942. https://doi.org/
10.1002/acp.1785
Anderson, M. C., & Green, C. (2001). Suppressing unwanted memories by exec-
utive control. Nature, 410, 366–369. https://doi.org/10.1038/35066572
Anderson, M. C., & Hanslmayr, S. (2014). Neural mechanisms of motivated
forgetting. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18, 279–292. doi.org/10.
1016/j.tics.2014.03.002
Chrobak, Q. M., & Zaragoza, M. S. (2008). Inventing stories: Forcing wit-
nesses to fabricate entire fictitious events leads to freely reported
false memories. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15, 1190–1195.
https://doi.org/10.3758/pbr.15.6.1190
Chrobak, Q. M., & Zaragoza, M. S. (2013). When forced fabrications
become truth: Causal explanations and false memory development.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142, 827–844. https://doi.
org/10.1037/a0030093
Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R. M., & Walkowitz, G. (2013). Lying and
team incentives. Journal of Economic Psychology, 34, 1–7. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.joep.2012.10.011
Drivdahl, S., & Zaragoza, M. (2001). The role of perceptual elaboration and indi-
vidual differences in the creation of false memories for suggested events.
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 15, 265–281. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.701
Hanba, J. M., & Zaragoza, M. S. (2007). Interviewer feedback in repeated
interviews involving forced confabulation. Applied Cognitive Psychol-
ogy, 21, 433–455. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1286
Innocent Project. (2020). Alfred Dewayne Brown: Texas Death Row
Exoneree, Featured in Netflix Series "The Innocence Files". https://
www.innocenceproject.org/alfred-dewayne-brown-texas-death-row-
exoneree-featured-in-the-innocence-files/
Kocher, M. G., Schudy, S., & Spantig, L. (2018). I lie? We lie! Why? Experi-
mental evidence on a dishonesty shift in groups. Management Science,
64(9), 3995–4008. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2800
Kouchaki, M., & Gino, F. (2016). Memories of unethical actions become
obfuscated over time. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
113, 6166–6171. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1523586113
Lee, M. D., & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2014). Bayesian cognitive modeling: A
practical course. Cambridge University Press.
MacLeod, C. M. (1998). Directed forgetting. In J. M. Golding & C. M. MacLeod
(Eds.), Intentional forgetting: Interdisciplinary approaches (pp. 1–57). Erlbaum.
Otgaar, H., & Baker, A. (2018). When lying changes memory for the truth.
Memory, 26, 2–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2017.1340286
Otgaar, H., Howe, M. L., Memon, A., & Wang, J. (2014). The development
of differential mnemonic effects of false denials and forced confabula-
tions. Behavioral Sciences & Law, 32, 718–731. https://doi.org/10.
1002/bsl.2148
RIESTHUIS ET AL. 7
Pezdek, K., Lam, S. T., & Sperry, K. (2009). Forced confabulation more
strongly influences event memory if suggestions are other-generated
than self-generated. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 14, 241–252.
https://doi.org/10.1348/135532508X344773
Pezdek, K., Sperry, K., & Owens, S. M. (2007). Interviewing witnesses: The
effect of forced confabulation on event memory. Law and Human
Behavior, 31, 463–478. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9081-5
Possley, M. (2015). Alfred Brown. https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4702
Rubin, D. C., Schrauf, R. W., & Greenberg, D. L. (2003). Belief and recollec-
tion of autobiographical memories. Memory & Cognition, 31, 887–901
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196443
Schindler, S., & Pfattheicher, S. (2017). The frame of the game: Loss-
framing increases dishonest behavior. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 69, 172–177. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2016.09.009
Schönbrodt, F. D., & Stefan, A. M. (2018). BFDA: An R package for Bayes
factor design analysis (version0.3) [Computer software]. https://
github.com/nicebread/BFDA
Schönbrodt, F. D., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2018). Bayes factor design anal-
ysis: Planning for compelling evidence. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,
25, 128–142.https://doi.org/10.3758/S13423-017-1230-Y
Shu, L. L., Gino, F., & Bazerman, M. H. (2011). Dishonest deed, clear con-
science: When cheating leads to moral disengagement and motivated
forgetting. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37, 330–349.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167211398138
Stanley, M. L., Yang, B. W., & Brigard, F. D. (2018). No evidence for
unethical amnesia for imagined actions: A failed replication and exten-
sion. Memory & Cognition, 46, 787–795. https://doi.org/10.3758/
s13421-018-0803-y
Weisel, O., & Shalvi, S. (2015). The collaborative roots of corruption. Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112, 10651–10656.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1423035112
Wouda, J., Bijlstra, G., Frankenhuis, W. E., & Wigboldus, D. H. J. (2017).
The collaborative roots of corruption? A replication of Weisel & Shalvi
(2015). Collabra: Psychology, 3, 27. http://doi.org/10.1525/collabra.97
Zaragoza, M. S., Payment, K. E., Ackil, J. K., Drivdahl, S. B., & Beck, M.
(2001). Interviewing witnesses: Forced confabulation and confirma-
tory feedback increase false memories. Psychological Science, 12, 473–
477. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00388
How to cite this article: Riesthuis, P., Otgaar, H., Hope, L., &
Mangiulli, I. (2021). Registered report: The effects of
incentivized lies on memory. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 1–8.
https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3838
APPENDIX
A: Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (Kouchaki & Gino, 2016)
Instructions: Please think back to the die throwing task you completed dur-
ing Part1 of the study. The following questions ask you about that task.
Please indicate your agreement with each of them.
1. As I think about the task, I can actually remember it.
a. 1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree
2. As I remember the task, I can feel now the emotions that I felt then.
a. 1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree
3. Overall, I remember this event.
a. 1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree
4. My memory of this event is dim
a. 1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree
5. I remember how I felt at the time I just recalled
a. 1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree
6. I remember what I thought at the time of the event I just recalled.
a. 1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree
B: Specific die rolling questions
For the following questions you will be rewarded for accuracy. This means
that for every correct answer you will receive $0.50. There are four ques-
tions in total (4 $0.50= $2). Please respond honestly to all questions.
























C: Questions used in pilot study
1. Mydie rollwas completely anonymous–only I could knowwhat I rolled
a. 1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree
2. I played the die roll game with another participant
a. 1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree
3. The throwing die was fair (completely random, like a real die)
a. 1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree
4. The researchers checked whether I cheated during the die roll game
a. 1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree
5. I cheated in the die rolling game
a. 1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree
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